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Why Taxing Carbon May Not Make the World More Green
Summary
Although taxing carbon is an idea that enjoys significant support among policymakers and business leaders,
new research indicates that carbon taxation can actually cause energy investments to gravitate away from the
cleanest energy technologies. This counterintuitive finding reflects two key characteristics of energy markets:
the worldwide increase in renewable energy sources whose output is intermittent and variable; and greater
market liberalization, which has made the spot driving of electricity more volatile. The intermittency of
renewable energy sources requires backup generation, typically from generators using fossil fuels. The
dynamics of market liberalization amplify this negative effect of intermittency. Policymakers need to take steps
to reduce intermittency by supporting storage technologies or setting monetary incentives to increase
renewable generation capacity investment.
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Why Taxing Carbon May Not 
Make the World More Green
Serguei Netessine, PhD and Sam Aflaki, PhD
There is an important yet largely overlooked link between the intermittent 
accessibility of renewable energy sources and the effectiveness of renewable-
promoting policies such as carbon pricing.
Putting a price on carbon is sometimes discussed in 
terms of a “tax,” but a carbon tax is not necessarily 
the same as a traditional tax, as the primary purpose 
is not to raise revenue but rather to reduce emissions. 
A variety of proposals exist that would introduce 
a revenue-neutral carbon tax in the U.S., with dis-
parities, of course, in the price itself and on how the 
revenue generated from the tax should be spent.1 But 
as a general topic of public policy, taxing carbon enjoys 
the support of some strange political bedfellows, from 
most Democrats and economists to nearly half of all 
Republicans and over 1,200 multinational corpora-
tions, including the United States’ own Exxon Mobil.2 
Over 140 global companies, including Microsoft and 
Cummins, already embed a carbon price deep within 
their business strategies and operations without any 
legal mandate to do so.3 While the Trump Admin-
istration has repeatedly denied that it will consider a 
carbon tax as part of its tax reform agenda, there is an 
important, new consideration about which policymak-
ers should be aware, should the topic arise.
We have discovered through our research a surpris-
ing, non-intuitive result concerning the effects of a 
carbon tax.4 When the price of carbon rises, invest-
ment in (greenhouse gas-free) renewable energy tech-
nology does become comparatively cheaper, but most 
SUMMARY
• Although taxing carbon is an idea that enjoys significant sup-
port among policymakers and business leaders, new research 
indicates that carbon taxation can actually cause energy invest-
ments to gravitate away from the cleanest energy technologies.
• This counterintuitive finding reflects two key characteristics 
about energy markets: the worldwide increase in renewable 
energy sources whose output is intermittent and variable; and 
greater market liberalization, which has made the spot pricing of 
electricity more volatile. The intermittency of renewable energy 
sources requires backup generation, typically from generators 
using fossil fuels. The dynamics of market liberalization amplify 
this negative effect of intermittency.
• Long-term fixed price contracts with electricity suppliers can 
help address the risk of volatile spot prices and encourage 
investment in renewables, but the intermittency problem will 
still force suppliers to employ emission-intensive generators 
for backup, and thus will fail to significantly abate emissions.
• Policymakers therefore also need to take steps to reduce in-
termittency by supporting the development of electricity stor-
age technologies or setting monetary incentives to increase 
renewable generation capacity investment.
• The price effects of market liberalization and the problem of 
intermittency must be addressed in concert, in order for carbon 
taxation to more effectively promote investment in renewables 
and reduce overall emissions.
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new capacity investment actually goes 
toward newer, more efficient (yet still 
GHG-emitting) gas-fired turbines. 
The reason is that, under the status 
quo, renewables remain chained to 
the heaviest GHG-emitting genera-
tors (see Figure 1). These fossil fuel 
sources—comprised predominantly of 
old, inefficient gas-fired turbines—are 
often the only generators that can 
quickly be brought online by electric-
ity suppliers to provide the necessary 
supply of energy when renewables 
are unable to meet energy demand. 
This dependence on emission-heavy 
reserves is a practical consequence 
of the intermittency of green energy 
sources and of renewable generators’ 
inability to store excess power. When 
carbon prices go up, the combination 
of renewables and emission-heavy 
reserves becomes too expensive rela-
tive to efficient gas-fired technologies. 
Ultimately, this leads the majority  
of uncoordinated investments made 
in the liberalized energy marketplace 
to gravitate away from the cleanest 
technology.
Before delving into potential policy 
responses to the problem of GHG 
emissions in light of this new finding, 
a clear understanding of energy mar-
kets is essential. To begin with, not one 
but two monumental developments 
have recently reshaped electricity gen-
eration, transmission, distribution, and 
retailing: the introduction of renew-
ables and market liberalization.
THE INTRODUCTION OF 
RENEWABLES
The worldwide increase in capacity 
installations for renewable sources of 
energy, such as wind and solar power, 
has been accelerating. In the last 
decade, wind capacity installations 
have increased tenfold. China has 
the greatest installed capacity in the 
world, followed by the United States, 
Germany, Spain, and India.5 But a 
critical aspect of renewable technolo-
gies is their intermittency—that is, 
the supply of electricity from these 
sources is typically uncertain. For 
instance, wind blows neither continu-
ously nor in concert with demand, 
and electricity generation from solar 
panels is volatile because of their sen-
sitivity to weather conditions, air pol-
lution, and other determinants of solar 
radiation intensity. Although some of 
this variability in supply is natural and 
can be planned for (e.g., the lack of 
generation from solar panels at night), 
there is still significant uncertainty 
associated with the outputs of renew-
able technologies. 
Investment in the capacity to gen-
erate renewable energy is hampered 
not only by intermittency but also by 
the high costs involved. A variety of 
strategies have been adopted to incen-
tivize investment in renewables. These 
strategies include establishing renew-
able portfolio standards, minimum 
prices for renewable energy injected 
into the grid (i.e., renewable feed-in 
tariffs), and multiyear subsidies and 
investment credits in some jurisdictions 
 1  Kotchen M, Turk Z, and Leiserowitz A (2017), “Public 
willingness to pay for a US carbon tax and preferences 
for spending the revenue,” Environmental Research Let-
ters, 12:9. Available at: http://iopscience.iop.org/ar-
ticle/10.1088/1748-9326/aa822a. 
 2  CDP, Global Carbon Price Report 2016, available at: 
https://www.cdp.net/en/research; and Alexander Kaufman, 
“Americans Are Willing to Pay a Carbon Tax, But Trump 
Won’t Even Consider It,” Huffington Post, October 12, 
2017.
 3  CDP, supra note 2; and Light S (2015), “Not the Only Game 
in Town: The Complementary Roles of Public and Private 
Environmental Governance,” Penn Wharton Public Policy 
Initiative, Issue Brief: Volume 3, No. 8.
 4  The research in this Issue Brief is based on Aflaki S and Ne-
tessine S (2017), “Strategic Investment in Renewable Ener-
gy Sources: The Effect of Supply Intermittency,” Manufac-
turing & Service Operations Management 19(3):489-507. 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0621. 
 5  Ren21 (2014), Renewables 2014 Global Status Report, 
REN21 Secretariat, Paris.
 6  For a critical review of various incentives for renewable en-
ergy investments, see Bushnell J (2010), “Building blocks: 
Investment in renewable and non-renewable technologies,” 
Moselle B, Padilla J, Schmalensee R, eds., Harnessing 
Renewable Energy in Electric Power Systems: Theory, 
Practice, Policy (Earthscan, Washington, DC), pp. 159–180. 
 7  Proposals for pricing the carbon emissions from fossil-fuel 
electricity plants include a carbon tax or a “cap and trade” 
system of credits. For a discussion of the various forms of 
carbon pricing in the context of technology planning, see 
Drake DF, Kleindorfer PR, Van Wassenhove LN (2016), 
“Technology choice and capacity portfolios under emis-
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as direct incentives for new renewable 
capacity.6 In addition to these direct 
incentives for renewable investment, 
there can be indirect incentives in the 
form of increased prices on fossil-fuel 
electricity generation (gas-fired, coal, 
etc.) through the penalizing of firms 
for technology-induced environmental 
damage. The most significant of these 
penalties is referred to generically as 
carbon pricing.7 
We find that increasing the carbon 
price has two counteracting effects 
on investments in renewables. On the 
one hand, it improves the cost com-
petitiveness of renewables relative to 
nonrenewable technologies—a result 
of the former’s lower greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. On the other hand, 
renewables require backup generation, 
which typically comes from generators 
using fossil fuels; thus, an increase in 
the carbon price leads to an increase 
in the cost of reserves to cover inter-
mittency. How these countervailing 
forces affect the technology share of 
renewables in the overall generation 
portfolio depends on the carbon price 
and also on the emission intensity 
of backup generation technologies. 
Often it is the older, more emission-
intensive technologies that are used 
for backup. So in stark contrast to 
intuition, increasing the carbon price 
may actually reduce the overall propor-
tion of renewable generation.8 
MARKET LIBERALIZATION
Besides the introduction of renew-
able sources, electricity markets have 
undergone another important change 
in the last two decades: market lib-
eralization. For almost a century, the 
electricity sector resembled a natural 
monopoly. All four primary elements 
of electricity supply—generation, 
transmission, distribution, and retail-
ing—were organized as a vertically 
integrated firm that was owned either 
privately or by the state and with price 
and entry regulations identical to 
natural monopolies. The logic of this 
approach was based on operational 
constraints associated with balanc-
ing the generation, transmission, and 
distribution of electricity. That balanc-
ing also contributed to the economics 
of electricity generation because it 
reduced retailing costs.9 The first step 
toward the liberalization of electricity 
markets was the “vertical unbundling” 
of the industry’s generators and retail-
ers. Such restructuring was motivated 
by the desire to create competition 
among generators, thereby reducing 
retail prices, and to prevent incumbent 
utilities from exploiting the market 
power stemming from their histori-
cally dominant position. The result is 
that market liberalization has rendered 
electricity a commodity that can be 
traded in wholesale electricity markets. 
In a competitive electricity market, 
power generators typically submit 
their supply offers to the market (grid 
or pool) administrator while retailers 
(representing their end-use electric-
ity customers) submit their demand 
bids. The independent system operator, 
responsible to meet all the demand, 
then sorts the supply offers from the 
lowest to the highest before sched-
uling dispatch based on the merit 
order—subject to transmission (and 
other physical) constraints. The effi-
cient dispatch algorithms used in this 
process, in combination with the bid-
ding rules, imply that the spot price 
of electricity under typical conditions 
and in a perfectly competitive market 
is determined by the marginal cost of 
the last unit of energy dispatched.10  
Hence, the spot price, which is 
extremely volatile, is determined 
by supply and the realized random 
demand.11
The problem is that wind genera-
tors suffer more under competition 
than under vertical integration. The 
intuitive explanation for this outcome 
is that the incentive of each genera-
sions regulation,” Production Oper. Management 25(6): 
1006–1025. 
 8 I focus on generation capacity rather than the total mon-
etary investment, which may or may not be higher than that 
for the conventional generation source.
 9  Michaels RJ (2007), “Vertical integration and the restruc-
turing of the U.S. electricity industry,” Working paper, Cato 
Institute Policy Analysis Series, California State University, 
Fullerton.
 10  Joskow PL (2006), “Competitive electricity markets and 
investment in new generating capacity,” Working paper, 
Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
 11  In practice, not only zero but also negative electricity 
prices are possible. That possibility reflects the costliness 
of supply adjustment even for renewable generators. 
See, e.g.,https://www.epexspot.com/en/company-info/
basics_of_the_power_market/negative_prices. 
 12  Joskow, supra note 10.
 13  Borenstein S (2002), “The trouble with electricity markets: 
Under-standing California’s restructuring disaster,” J. 
Econom. Perspect. 16(1):191–211. 
 14  Such a bilateral arrangement takes one of two possible 
forms (see Borenstein). In an electricity pool, or market-
based bilateral contracts, all generators sell to a pool run 
by an independent sys- tem operator and all suppliers buy 
from that pool. In this case, the ISO manages the physical 
feasibility of electricity flow within the network. An alterna-
tive is for buyers and sellers to make their own arrange-
ments for the purchase of electricity and then to inform 
the system operator about those arrangements. Here the 
system operator steps in only if some physical infeasibility 
might otherwise occur—as when a part of the transmis-
NOTES 
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tor to underinvest in the competition 
scenario depends not only on its unit 
total cost but also on the market price. 
A higher carbon price increases the 
unit cost of gas-generated electricity, 
which under competition creates a 
disincentive for the gas generator to 
invest. Similarly, the intermittency of 
wind generation creates a disincentive 
for the wind generator to invest under 
competition. The reason is that the 
spot price of electricity is decreasing 
in the availability of wind capacity; 
this puts wind at a significant com-
petitive disadvantage because the price 
is lowest when wind is available and is 
highest when wind is not available. In 
short, the spot-price disadvantage of 
wind dominates. As the carbon price 
rises, this disadvantage is balanced by 
the emission disadvantage of the gas 
technology, which decreases the gas 
generator’s incentive to invest, because 
higher investment pushes the spot 
price down and results in less revenue. 
A principal takeaway from the 
development of liberalized markets, 
therefore, is that the negative effect 
of intermittency is amplified by the 
marginal-cost pricing that is typical 
of such markets. This finding offers 
novel support for the hypothesis that 
market liberalization—over and above 
intermittency—leads to underinvest-
ment in renewable electric generation 
capacity.12
POLICY RESPONSES
To counter the disincentives to invest 
in renewables in a liberalized mar-
ket, public policy experts suggest 
long-term fixed-price contracts with 
generators so that investment in new 
generating capacity will be protected 
from the risk of volatile spot prices.13 
For instance, long-term contracts 
involving wind developers, electric-
ity suppliers, and large customers are 
used in the United States and Europe 
to promote investment in renewable 
capacity. Such fixed-price contracts 
with renewable generators are typi-
cally benchmarked on feed-in tariffs, 
often with regulatory guarantees, 
that specify long-term prices based 
on generation costs rather than spot 
prices. Using numerical experiments 
with real-world data, we find that 
fixed-price contracts are effective at 
stimulating investment in renewables 
in a liberalized market. However, 
overreliance on carbon-intensive 
backup generation may significantly 
lessen the environmental benefits 
of using renewables relative to the 
hypothetical case in which firms are 
vertically integrated. 
FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS 
Given the volatility of spot prices, 
bilateral forward contracts between 
suppliers and generators play a sig-
nificant role in almost all electricity 
markets today.14 The time horizon of 
the forward contracts can range from 
a single day to 15-20 years. In the 
United States, long-term forward con-
tracts have been advocated as a means 
to promote investment in renewable 
generation capacity and to “spur the 
growth of renewable generation.”15 In 
a number of states (including Mas-
sachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, 
and Delaware), the legal instruments 
are already in place to sign long-term 
power purchase agreements with fixed 
prices and with contracting horizons 
of 10-25 years. Germany and Spain, 
the two European countries with 
highest installed capacity for renew-
able energy, have used long-term 
fixed-price contracts to promote 
renewable energy investments. 
In the case of unbridled market 
competition, fixed-price contracts 
increase the installed wind capacity 
and decrease the gas capacity. This is 
because the wind generator now has 
the clear advantage of no uncertainty 
in prices. Somewhat surprisingly, 
however, there is little difference in gas 
capacity investment between the fixed-
sion grid is overloaded. In that case, the ISO sets grid usage 
charges to balance the network. 
 15  Wilson NE, Newell RG, Burtraw D (2005), The Effect of 
Long-Term Generation Contracts on Valuation of Electricity 
Generating Assets Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (Resources for the Future, Washington, DC). 
 16  Of course, these statements hold only for relatively high 
shares of renewable electricity generation capacity, for 
which emission-free backup generation (such as hydro-
power) does not exist.
 17  See, e.g., Wu OQ, Kapuscinski R (2013), “Curtailing inter-
mittent generation in electrical systems,” Manufacturing & 
Service Oper. Management 15(4):578–595.
NOTES 
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price contracting and market competi-
tion scenarios. 
These contracts are a viable means 
of compensating for the disadvan-
tages of market liberalization from the 
standpoints of total cost and greenness. 
Yet they could also lead to dramatic 
overinvestment in renewables and 
underinvestment in gas generation 
(relative to vertical integration) for 
high enough carbon prices. The likely 
result would be an overreliance on the 
emission-heavy backup (coal-fired) 
generators, given the total absence of 
workable and scalable solutions for 
storing unutilized renewable energy. 
Besides degrading the environment, 
that outcome could also lead to grid-
balancing issues—should the need 
arise for significant backup generation. 
To put this another way, although 
the overall increase in wind capacity 
under a regime of fixed-price contracts 
is good news, there is no free lunch: 
the increase in wind and total capacity 
is such that emissions in this setting 
remain higher than under vertical 
integration. The installed gas capacity 
in this case is insufficient to provide 
backup for the intermittent wind 
capacity, forcing the supplier to employ 
the emission-intensive backup option. 
In short, fixed-price contracts are suc-
cessful at promoting renewables but 
fail to significantly abate emissions.16
REDUCING INTERMITTENCY ITSELF
The intermittency of renewable energy 
sources is a problematic feature that 
handicaps investment decisions in 
these technologies. It then follows 
that a more effective approach to 
increasing capacity investment in 
renewables would be to reduce the 
effect of intermittency itself. Reduc-
ing intermittency would increase the 
effectiveness of carbon pricing as a 
green-promoting strategy because not 
only would it eliminate that pricing’s 
burden on renewables (since there 
would then be less need for a backup 
technology), but it would also amelio-
rate renewables’ spot-price disadvan-
tage in electricity markets.
There are various options for 
reducing the intermittency of renew-
ables. The first of these is electricity 
storage, for which various (relatively 
new) technologies are available, albeit 
in prototype form mostly. These 
technologies include pumped-storage 
hydropower, which stores electric-
ity in the form of potential energy, 
and pumped-heat electricity storage, 
which uses argon gas to store power 
in the form of heat. And Tesla has 
developed the first potentially scal-
able form of renewable energy storage 
in the form of a battery that retains 
excess solar power for use in indi-
vidual homes. But these technologies 
have a long way to go and will require 
significant investment before they can 
begin to noticeably reduce the inter-
mittency prevalent in the status quo.
Other options besides storage 
include the “curtailing” of intermit-
tent generation17 and the pooling of 
multiple generation units (possibly 
with different technologies) whose 
supply is not perfectly correlated. 
This latter approach may be pos-
sible only for large generators with 
enough resources to invest in multiple 
wind farms in different (strategically 
located) geographical regions. So even 
though there are no economies of 
scale in wind electricity generation, 
there are clear statistical economies 
of scale in terms of reduced intermit-
tency. As of yet, however, there has 
been no concerted effort to pool tech-
nologies to reduce intermittency.
Policymakers can aid the curtailing 
of intermittency by offering additional 
monetary incentives to generators who 
make investments to improve capacity 
and effectively reduce suppliers’ reli-
ance on emission-heavy backup forms 
of energy. Rather simply, policymakers 
can set new capacity standards. The 
hypothetical (or real) cost of carbon 
between a generator’s current capacity 
and a new capacity standard could be 
offered as a subsidy alongside current 
feed-in tariffs to reward a generator 
for ensuring renewable energy supply 
(see Figure 2). If the feed-in tariffs 
currently in practice incent increased 
renewable investment, then an addi-
tional subsidy could reward (primarily 
large) generators for better manage-
ment and mitigation of intermittency. 
Such an incentive could induce gen-
erators to invest in multiple renewable 
sources (instead of only one, as most 
currently do), as well as to invest in 
scalable storage technology, and it 
could place an emphasis for the first 
time on strategically designing and 
implementing new plants, with an eye 
towards counter-balancing renewable 
energy sources.
CONCLUSION
Although increasing the price of car-
bon emissions does lead to lower total 
emissions, this policy is not a univer-
sally good way to promote investment 
in renewables. Moreover, market liber-
alization may not promote efficient 
investment in generation capacity. 
Liberalization leads to an increase in 
total emissions from the generation 
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portfolio, and for a reasonable range 
of carbon prices it leads to a lower 
share of renewables than in a scenario 
where all electricity generators are 
vertically integrated. The root cause of 
these effects is the interaction between 
intermittency and market pricing. 
Long-term electricity contracts do 
ameliorate some disadvantages of the 
liberalized markets. Namely, they lead 
to a significant increase in renewable 
capacity investment while not appre-
ciably affecting nonrenewable capaci-
ties. In this way, long-term contracts 
with renewable generators increase 
the total installed capacity and reduce 
emissions relative to the case of 
unrestricted market competition. But 
since firms likely will not reintegrate, 
additional monetary incentives may be 
required to reduce renewable energy 
intermittency and spur greater invest-
ment in new renewable capacity.
The Energy Portfolio of a Large Supplier
High-Emitting
Source
Renewable
Source
0% 100%
Current Renewable
Capacity
New Capacity
Standard
Cost of Carbon =
Value of Subsidy
FIGURE 2 MONETARY INCENTIVE FOR REDUCING INTERMITTENCY
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